The Lusitania Resource
Frequently Asked Questions

Disclaimer:  I have answered these questions to the best of my ability, my conclusions drawn from what I have read, the evidence available and not, and assessed to be probable and plausible.  I am aware that not everyone will agree with the answers given in this FAQ and can only encourage people to read on their own and reach their own conclusions.  Regardless of whether you agree or disagree with these answers, any feedback you may have is welcome.

  1. Were Lusitania and Titanic sister ships?

    A:  No.  This is a common misconception because Lusitania and Titanic are two of the most well-known maritime disasters in history, so they are often linked in people's minds.  The owners of Lusitania and Titanic were from separate companies and rivals, as Lusitania was operated by the Cunard Line, and Titanic was operated by the White Star Line.  Lusitania's sister ship was Mauretania, and they had a "half sister" or "cousin" named Aquitania.  Mauretania and Aquitania both had long, successful, and illustrious careers, with Aquitania serving in both world wars.  Titanic's sisters were Olympic and Britannic, with only Olympic having survived into old age. 


  2. Who built Lusitania?

    A:  John Brown and Company, Shipbuilders, Clydebank, Scotland


  3. Who designed Lusitania?

    A:  Leonard Peskett


  4. Who owned Lusitania?

    A:   Cunard Line, Ltd. They are still in business today, carrying people across the ocean in style with their latest ocean liner, Queen Mary 2. Visit their website.


  5. Where can I find Lusitania deck plans?


  6. Where can I find a timeline of Lusitania events?


  7. What day did Lusitania sink?

    A:  7 May 1915, a Friday


  8. What time was Lusitania hit by the torpedo?

    A:  2:10 p.m.


  9. How long did Lusitania take to sink?

    A:  18 minutes.


  10. What was the name of the U-boat (or submarine) that sank Lusitania?

    A:  U-20


  11. Who commanded the U-20 when she sank Lusitania?

    A:  Wather Schwieger, Captain-lieutenant of the Imperial German Navy.


  12. Who was Lusitania's captain on her last voyage?

    A:  Captain William Thomas Turner


  13. How many crossings did Lusitania make before she was sunk?

    A:  Lusitania completed 201 crossings (one-way), which is also 100 voyages (round-trip).  She was on her 202nd crossing and return leg of her 101st voyage when she was sunk.


  14. How much did a Saloon (first-class) ticket cost on Lusitania?

    A:  It depends on the accommodation.  Marie Depage paid $142.50 for her cabin E 61, low in the ship.  John McConnel paid $185 for his cabin D 36.  George Kessler's cabin, A 23, cost $380.  The regal suites on B Deck, I'm sure, cost the most.  While these prices seem to be "only" in the hundreds, keep inflation in mind, as during this time period, the average American only made $20 a week.


  15.  Did Lusitania ever go to Australia or New Zealand?

    A:  A Lusitania did, but not the famous Cunarder.   The Orient Line had a ship named Lusitania that ran regularly between Britain and Australia from 1877 to 1898. There was also a Portuguese Lusitania shipwrecked off the South African coast. You can read more here.


  16.  Family histories tell me that I had a relative aboard the Lusitania's last voyage.  Why can't I find him/her on the passenger or crew lists?


  17. I had a relative who crossed on one of the Lusitania's previous voyages.  How do I find the passenger manifest from that crossing?

    A:  I recommend either www.ellisisland.org (where you can search by your relative's name) or www.immigrantships.net (search by ship).  While I would love to eventually post every single one of Lusitania's passenger lists, I have a hard enough time maintaining the 1200 biographies of crossing #202. I can hardly imagine what it would be like to maintain the biographies of at least 242,200 persons who had sailed on Lusitania during her entire career!


  18. I had a relative who was a crew member on one of the Lusitania's previous voyages.  How do I find the crew manifest from that crossing?

    A:  Unfortunately, I don't know the answer to this one.  Maybe someone more knowledgable in this area can point out the way?


  19. How many people died when the Lusitania sank?


  20. Was anyone on board both Titanic and Lusitania when they sank?

    A:  A man by the Frank Toner (often misspelled 'Tower'), a fireman on Lusitania, claimed to also have been a fireman on Titanic and Empress of Ireland, the latter of which sank in 1914; however, Toner's name does not appear on the crew lists of either Titanic or Empress of Ireland. There were also a number of close calls and claimed close calls, such as the ticket cancellation of Lucile, Lady Duff-Gordon, who survived Titanic in lifeboat 1 but was too ill to sail on Lusitania's last crossing.  The "Unsinkable" Molly Brown, however, was definitely not on Lusitania's last crossing and did not plan to be on board.


  21. How many Lusitania survivors are still alive today?

    A:  One known survivor is still living today, Audrey Lawson-Johnston (née Pearl), saloon class passenger.  Barbara McDermott (née Anderson), second cabin passenger, passed away in 2008.


  22. How do I contact a Lusitania survivor?

    A: While I had been in contact with Mrs. McDermott, I am not in contact with Mrs. Lawson-Johnston.  Unfortunately, I do not have her contact information. Even if I did, for privacy reasons, it would be best not divulge that information to the general public.


  23. What warnings did Lusitania receive (or not receive) about submarines?

    - Thursday, 6 May, 7:52 p.m.: "SUBMARINES ACTIVE OFF SOUTH COAST OF IRELAND."
    - Thursday, 6 May, 8:30 p.m.: "TO ALL BRITISH SHIPS 0005: TAKE LIVERPOOL PILOT AT BAR AND AVOID HEADLANDS. PASS HARBOURS AT FULL SPEED. STEER MID-CHANNEL COURSE. SUBMARINES OFF FASTNET."
    - Friday, 7 May, 11:25 a.m.: "SUBMARINE ACTIVE IN SOUTHERN PART OF IRISH CHANNEL, LAST HEARD OF TWENTY MILES SOUTH OF CONINGBEG LIGHT VESSEL. MAKE CERTAIN LUSITANIA GETS THIS."
    - Friday, 7 May, 12:40 p.m.: "SUBMARINE FIVE MILES SOUTH OF CAPE CLEAR, PROCEEDING WEST WHEN SIGHTED AT 10:00 A.M."

    Worth noting is that all of these messages to Lusitania were general directives, and absolutely nothing about the sinkings of Earl of Latham, sunk 5 May; Candidate, sunk 6 May, 7:40 a.m.; Centurion, sunk 6 May, 2:30 p.m.; or the attempt on the Cayo Romano, also on 6 May, all off the south coast of Ireland, were ever relayed to Lusitania.  In total, 23 ships had been sunk off the Irish coast after Lusitania left New York on 1 May 1915, no news of any of these sinkings were ever relayed to Lusitania.


  24.  Was Lusitania badly designed?

    A:  In hindsight, it is easy for people to say that longitudinal bulkheads did more harm to Lusitania than good, but the failure of Lusitania's watertight integrity is more a fault of overdesign than shoddy construction.  Lusitania and Mauretania, funded by government money and designed with government oversight, were deliberately overdesigned to limit flooding throughout the ship.  In addition to the horizontal bulkheads that ran the width of the ship, Lusitania and Mauretania also had longitudinal bulkheads that ran the length of the ship.  Unfortunately, these longitudinal bulkheads, once filled with water, would cause the ship to list severely one side because these bulkheads would not allow the weight of the water to be distributed throughout the width of the ship.  With enough of these longitudinal compartments breached, the ship would capsize.  Open portholes, doors, and open decks higher up the ship would be submerged as the ship listed, and as water poured through these perforations in the ship, Lusitania's fate was sealed.

    Lusitania's problems were compounded further as the longitudinal bulkheads doubled as coal bunkers for the boiler rooms.  Coal doors that double as watertight doors would have been difficult to close with scraps of coal in the way.  Even if the rate of Lusitania's flooding was not fatal, coal absorbs water and therefore water weight.  Therefore, even if flooding had been controlled, Lusitania would have continued to list, endangering the stability of the ship and the safety of her passengers and crew.  Note that this is not to say that Leonard Peskett or the Admiralty were incompetent shipbuilders, rather, Lusitania's overdesign is a classic case where more safety precautions is definitely not safer.


  25.  Was Captain Turner at fault for the torpedoing of the Lusitania?

    A: Firstly, let it be said that Captain Turner was an experienced captain, one of the best in the business.  Cunard would not have entrusted one of its prized possessions to an underqualified captain.  As the captain of the ship, Turner was ultimately responsible for anything that happened to his ship and passengers and crew.  Admiralty instructions that Turner had been following were:

    1) posting extra lookouts
    2) keeping lifeboats ready for lowering in the war zone
    3) keeping radio silence within 100 miles of land
    4) blacking out lights at night

    Worth noting was that Lusitania did not have all of her portholes closed as ordered, nor was her crew trained in handling lifeboats.  Even with the ship's heavy list, many fatalities on the port side of the ship could have been avoided if the crew had been better trained in handling lifeboats.

    Now, let's examine Admiralty instructions that Turner had been accused of disregarding during the inquest:

    a) Failure to avoid headlands

    The Admiralty's legal team would lead people to believe that Captain Turner was too close to land when Lusitania was torpedoed, therefore Turner was in violation of the directives to avoid headlands and to steer a mid-channel course.  Turner himself stated that at the time of the torpedoing, Lusitania was 13 to 15 miles from land, which is confirmed by the location of the wreck.  The Admiralty's attempt to smear Captain Turner, however, insisted throughout the inquiry that Lusitania was only 8 miles from the Old Head of Kinsale.  Regardless of the true distance, during peacetime, ships pass the Old Head of Kinsale at a distance of 2 miles.  Captain Turner had exceeded this distance by more than 10 miles.  Had Turner ignored this directive and took Lusitania on her peacetime course, she would have missed the U-20 entirely.  As for the possibility of being farther out from the Irish coast, the message Lusitania received on Friday, 7 May, 11:25 a.m. read: "SUBMARINE ACTIVE IN SOUTHERN PART OF IRISH CHANNEL, LAST HEARD OF TWENTY MILES SOUTH OF CONINGBEG LIGHT VESSEL."  With this information, Turner had believed (wrongly) that going farther out to sea would have put Lusitania in the path of this reported submarine.

    b) Failure to steer a mid-channel course

    An examination of the geography of Europe would show that on her last crossing, Lusitania had not been in a channel and was not in a channel when she was torpedoed; she was in the Celtic Sea.  The land directly south of Ireland is not France but Spain.  Anyone would have interpreted "mid-channel" as being applicable to only the North Channel, St. George's Channel, and the English Channel, particularly the Straits of Dover.  Lusitania was in none of these places.  Steering a mid-channel course would have been impossible for Lusitania as she was not in a channel.  

    Furthermore, Captain Turner was making landfall after 6 days at sea and steaming through thick fog.  At this point, he would have been concerned with accurate navigation, running aground in rocky waters, and submarines.  Making landfall would have been required for navigation unless special instructions were sent to the ship.  An example of special instructions would be such an order given to the cruiser Gloucester, which, while returning to Britain from Gibraltar, was given instructions "to pass 60 miles west of Cape Finisterre, to cross the parallel of 50 North in Longitude 9 West and then steer a mid-channel course up the Irish Channel.  After passing 49N she was to maintain a speed of not less than twenty knots and to zigzag" (Beesly, 100).

    Relying on general instructions that Lusitania received to steer a mid-channel course without making landfall is absurd.  Given the detailed instructions that the Admiralty gave to ships traveling through the war zone, it is not surprising that the lack of such specific orders on Lusitania's last crossing and issuing only general orders would have confused Turner.  

    c) Failure to steam at full speed

    True, at 18 knots, Lusitania was not steaming at full speed.  Keep in mind, however, that Lusitania's speed was second only to her sister Mauretania.  At her reduced speed of 18 knots, Lusitania was still faster than all but eight other ships in the merchant marine, and faster than all the German submarines, regardless of whether they were submerged or on the surface.

    d) Failure to zigzag

    This charge is more problematic.  Olympic had zigzagged to avoid a U-boat in the fall of 1914, so this practice was not unknown.  Turner himself stated during the inquiry that he was aware of the Admiralty promoting zigzagging, but his private conversations with Albert Bestic stated that "they didn't even explain to me about zigzagging."  But how could this be?  Attorney-General Edward Carson questioned Turner about receiving this Admiralty instruction, dated to 16 April 1915:
    War experience has shown that fast steamers can considerably reduce the chance of successful surprise submarine attacks by zigzagging -- that is to say, altering the course at short and irregular intervals, say in ten minutes to half an hour. This course is almost invariably adopted by warships when cruising in an area known to be infested with submarines. The underwater speed of a submarine is very slow and it is exceedingly difficult for her to get into position to deliver an attack unless she can observe and predict the course of the ship attacked.
    Bailey and Ryan state that this order is "reasonably clear" (pg 142), and Turner himself acknowledged receiving such an order, but he also stated, "it sounds very different from when I read it."

    Around the time of Lusitania's last departure from Liverpool on 17 April 1915, Captain Webb of the Admiralty's Trade Division was preparing new instructions for merchant ships on how to deal with the U-boat danger.  These instructions included, for the first time in print as a general instruction, how merchant ships were to follow Royal Navy practice and zigzag in danger areas.  These instructions had to be submitted to Churchill for approval before being sent out, which Churchill did not do until 25 April, the day after Captain Turner brought Lusitania to New York for the last time.  Distribution of this order outside the Admiralty did not start until 13 May, almost a week after Lusitania's demise.  Therefore, whatever orders Turner received on 16 April could not have been the same orders that were not issued until 13 May.  Then it is no wonder why Turner's recollection of the order was different from what Carson read at the inquiry.  The order that Carson read was not the order Turner received but the order issued on 13 May, conveniently backdated to 16 April, the day before Lusitania departed Liverpool for the last time.

    The orders the Admiralty issued on 13 May were for all ships.  What Turner received on 16 April must have been specific to Lusitania and must have mentioned zigzagging, but in words less clear on what it was, how to do it, and why it was important than what Carson read to him.  This earlier version of instructions must have been more open to misinterpretation, as Turner himself had stated that he thought zigzagging was only to be used when a submarine had been sighted.  That being the case, it is no wonder that Carson read the 13 May directions instead of the directions that Turner actually received and would have found familiar.  The clearer, and later, instructions that Carson read served to paint the Admiralty in a better light while making Captain Turner a convenient scapegoat.

    Furthermore, Turner had been zigzagging on the afternoon of 7 May, steering a serpentine course for more than an hour around noon.  Second cabin passenger Daniel Moore stated that "Lusitania was zig-zagging along at a speed of about 19 knots," and between 1:00 p.m. and 1:40 p.m. Lusitania "swerved so violently that she listed heavily" (Bailey/Ryan 143).  Of course, faced with a legal team determined to prove Turner guilty of negligence, Turner did not have much of a chance to to state that his unconventional course changes that afternoon were a faithful adherence to his instructions.  At the New York liability trial, and even to the end of his life, Turner maintained that he had been following Admiralty instructions to the best of his abilities.

    What remains inexplicable is why, at 1:45 p.m. on 7 May, Captain Turner decided to turn and hold Lusitania onto a course of 87 degrees east for a steady four-point bearing.  This action required 40 minutes of steaming in a straight line, which in a war zone goes against common sense.  Had whatever orders Turner received been so unclear that he thought zigzagging was only necessary after danger was sighted?  It was more than halfway through these 40 minutes that U-20 fired upon Lusitania, as the ship had not changed her bearings for the previous 25 minutes, making her vulnerable to attack.

    Patrick Beesly attempts to explain away this action by pointing out that Turner was making landfall for the first time in 6 days.  With all the rocks off southern Ireland, of course Turner needed accurate navigation, hence the four-point bearing.  Continued zigzagging would not allow Turner to establish his position, and he had already mistaken some other piece of land for Brow's Head.  The four-point bearing would allow Turner to confirm, beyond a doubt, where Lusitania's exact position was.  This would be a fine explanation, except that a sun-line bearing (requiring five minutes) or a cross bearing (requiring only three minutes) would have sufficed and were no less accurate than a four-point bearing.  When presented with this evidence at the inquiry, Turner remained unconvinced that cross-bearings were just as accurate as a four-point bearing.  It would seem that Turner was more concerned with running aground than an attack from a submarine, but, to be fair, rocks were a certainty off the coast of Ireland; submarine attacks were not.  A.A. Hoehling even wonders if Turner's lapse in judgment was attributable to a medical condition, "elevated blood pressure," or even "a small stroke" (Hoehling and Hoehling, 247).

    On the other hand, one should keep in mind that the order Carson read wanted ships to change course every "ten minutes to half an hour."  Turner had held Lusitania on a straight course from 1:45 p.m. to 2:10 p.m. when she was struck.  Twenty-five minutes is within the 30 minute window suggested by the Admiralty.  Admittedly, this is a weak defense as Turner was clear that he intended to hold the course for another 15 minutes, which would have been over the Admiralty's 30 minute limit, unless the directives Turner received on 16 April specified longer or no time intervals on zigzagging.  

    Beesly also wonders if Turner's course of action had anything to do with the Admiralty orders that are still unavailable to the general public.  The fact that crew was bringing luggage on deck, remarks to a member of the US Embassy, and the recollection of Quartermaster Hugh Johnston "at half past one . . . we altered the course two or three times in towards the land; I do not know what for," indicates that Lusitania was not bypassing Queenstown, but rather heading for it, a theory echoed by Patrick O'Sullivan.  If this had been the case, Lusitania would have had to make another abrupt turn in course after 2:25 p.m. to enter Queenstown Harbour, and not continue to steam in a straight line that Bailey and Ryan have accused Turner of planning.  Bailey and Ryan's accusation that Turner did not even consider taking Lusitania through the safer North Channel is equally unfair.  As the radio exchanges between the Admiralty and Lusitania from 5 May to 7 May are still classified, one cannot say with certainty that Turner did not request to take his ship through the North Channel, only to be denied.

    To fully understand the actions Turner took that fateful Friday afternoon in 1915, one would have to look at the signals exchanged between the Admiralty and Lusitania from 5 to 7 May.  Until these records become public, however, the reasons for Captain Turner's actions or inactions can only be theorized.


  26.  Was Lusitania carrying munitions?

    A:  Yes.  The cargo manifest shows that Lusitania was carrying small arms munitions, which by themselves would not have been enough to sink the ship if detonated.  The cargo manifest also shows aluminum powder, that, if thrown into the air by the torpedo impact, is explosive at the right concentrations.  The cargo manifest also shows Lusitania carrying fuses near her stern refrigerators and empty shrapnel shells in the forward magazine; however, cargo manifests of previous voyages show fuses and filled shrapnel shells stored together in the forward magazine.  The fact that cargo manifest from the last crossing is different from previous manifests suggests a cover-up.  If filled shrapnel shells meant "filled with gunpowder," a reaction with fuses stored nearby due to torpedo impact would have caused an explosion. If filled shrapnel shells only meant "filled with shrapnel," an explosion would not have happened.  Regardless of whether the shells detonated, any such speculation would have been eliminated by changing the details of cargo manifest, by emptying the shrapnel shells and placing the shells and fuses as far apart on the ship as possible.


  27.  Was Lusitania a legitimate target of war?

    A:  While it is certainly abominable to deliberately sink a ship with civilians on board, the fact remains that Lusitania was a British -- and therefore belligerent -- ship that had the capability to be converted into an auxiliary cruiser, and that she was running munitions and other war supplies through a German blockade.  According to cruiser laws, the Germans should have fired a warning shot across the bow, stopped the ship, and confiscated or destroyed the contraband; however, Churchill had sent explicit orders for British captains not to stop their ships for German submarines, but to ram them at full speed.  Stopping for submarines would have been grounds for a court martial.  With German U-boats unable to stop ships without the threat of being rammed, if Captain-lieutenant Walther Schwieger of the U-20 wanted to stop Lusitania's munitions from being used against his countrymen, his only available course of action would have been to torpedo the ship.

    What Lusitania was not, however, is also important.  She was not an armed auxiliary of the Royal Navy; she was not a warship; she was not carrying Canadian troops, and her cargo did not carry a large shipment of guncotton disguised as cheese or furs.


  28.  Did exploding munitions sink Lusitania?  If not, what caused her to sink so quickly, especially if she was almost as big as Titanic?

    A:  No one knows for sure, as Lusitania is resting with her torpedo wound against the sea floor.  The most popular theory as of now states that munitions were not responsible for the second explosion, but rather, that the second explosion was a steam line rupture.  This theory states that one torpedo was sufficient to sink the ship, having targeted a weak spot in the ship's design, and that the second explosion of the steam rupture was not fatal to Lusitania.  The longitudinal bulkheads, designed to limit flooding, concentrated the weight of water on one side of the ship and endangered Lusitania's stability, causing her sinking.

    Other explosion theories:

    - Coal dust explosion, advanced by Dr. Robert Ballard, discoverer of the Titanic wreck.  A torpedo hitting under the bridge, as described by witnesses, would have hit the forward coal bunker.  The torpedo would have kicked the coal dust into the air, and as it settled, would have reached explosive concentrations, triggering the second explosion.

    - Boiler explosion.  The fact that all functioning boiler rooms had survivors indicate that this is unlikely to be the source of the second explosion.  Furthermore, the expulsion of Inspector Pierpont, Margaret Gwyer, and Hal Taylor from funnel #2 late in the sinking suggests that several minutes, not seconds, elapsed between the torpedo impact and any boiler explosions.

    - Aluminum powder explosion, advanced by Patrick O'Sullivan.  Similar to the coal dust theory, a torpedo hitting the magazine would have kicked the stored aluminum powder into the air, and as it settled, would have reached explosive concentrations, triggering the second explosion.  The magazine, however, is forward of the bridge area where the torpedo impacted, but on the side of this theory, none of the baggage handlers who were above the magazine survived the sinking.  Furthermore, the washing up of furs along the Irish coast indicate that the cargo hold was indeed breached during the sinking.

    - Ammunition.  As stated in the previous question, the declared ammunition on the cargo manifest would have been insufficient to cause a fatal explosion, but if the shrapnel shells were indeed filled with gunpowder and stored next to the fuses in the forward magazine, then an explosion is possible.  The problems and pluses with this theory are the same as in the aluminum powder explosion theory:  the magazine is forward of the bridge area where the torpedo impacted, none of the baggage handlers who were above the magazine survived the sinking, and the cargo hold was breached.

    - Pipe bomb, advanced by Max Allan Collins.  Germany had been developing pipe bombs for destroying Allied munitions supplies during World War I, the most famous case of German sabotage being the Black Tom explosion of 30 July 1916 in Jersey City, New Jersey, United States.  This explosion destroyed the major munitions depot of the northeastern United States.  Inspector Pierpont had arrested three German spies on board Lusitania just after the liner's last departure from New York.  The men were supposedly found with a camera, but the mission of the men remains unknown.  In light of known actions of German agents abroad, it is possible that German agents planted a pipe bomb in the cargo hold to destroy contraband going to the British, and that the bomb was detonated by the torpedo impact.

    - Second torpedo, the favorite theory of the inquest.  Some witnesses such as William Adams claimed to have seen two torpedoes strike Lusitania, and Joseph Casey even claimed to have seen a third torpedo head toward Lusitania.  This theory is contradicted by Schwieger's war diary and the testimony of everyone in U-20. If another torpedo had been fired, it would have been from another submarine in the area and not the U-20.  No other submarine has claimed credit for also sinking Lusitania, but if the theory is right, then perhaps the sinking's international backlash against Germany would have kept any other submarine crews quiet.


  29.  Did Winston Churchill engineer a conspiracy to sink Lusitania and bring the United States into World War I?

    A:  The speculation about the conspiracy theory comes from a letter Winston Churchill sent to Walter Runciman, the president of Britain's Board of Trade.  In this letter, Churchill wrote, 'It is most important to attract neutral shipping to our shores in the hope especially of embroiling the United States with Germany . . . . For our part we want the traffic -- the more the better; and if some of it gets into trouble, better still.'

    One can also question the lack of action on behalf of the Admiralty in light of the Admiralty's previous records of looking after Lusitania.  Lusitania was a symbol of national prestige.  Naturally, more privileges were granted to her than to any other ship.  

    When Lusitania was scheduled to arrive in Liverpool on 6 March 1915, Trade Division signalled Lusitania at Cunard's request, relaying,"Owners advise keep well out.  Time arrival to cross bar without waiting."

    Admiral Henry Oliver also sent two destroyers, HMS Laverock and HMS Louis to receive and escort Lusitania, and sent Q ship HMS Lyons to patrol Liverpool Bay, even with the shortage of available destroyers at the time.  Captain Dow, not wishing to disclose his location to listening Germans, steamed Lusitania into Liverpool by herself.  

    Compare this with Lusitania's last crossing, where the Admiralty took no precautions to protect Lusitania.  No specific orders, no escorts, no Q ships.  Even when the destroyers Lucifer, Legion, Linnet, and Laverock were sitting idly at Milford Haven, Wales, and were available for such a job.  Even when the Admiralty knew full well of the danger Lusitania was heading into, the Admiralty did not relay the news of the sinkings of Earl of Lathom, Candidate, Centurion, and the attempt on the Cayo Romano, to Lusitania despite the fact that these incidents were reported to the Admiralty and specifically requested to reach Lusitania.  Twenty-three merchant vessels had been torpedoed in the general area Lusitania was steaming through since Lusitania left New York, and absolutely no word of any of these attacks were relayed to Lusitania.  Radio silence would not have been an excuse, as Admiral Oliver could have alerted Vice Admiral Coke at Queenstown of the danger if he could not reach Lusitania.

    Furthermore, radio exchanges between Lusitania and the Admiralty from 5 to 7 May remain classified to this day.  This has led to speculation that Captain Turner had requested to divert Lusitania north around Ireland and through the North Channel and was denied.  The North Channel route was cleared of mines by 15 April 1915 and the Admiralty could permit merchant ships to pass through if given the OK.  Being denied this route, Captain Turner would have had to take Lusitania south, where she was torpedoed.

    The fact that no correspondence between Churchill and First Sea Lord Jacky Fisher from the time of Lusitania's last crossing has survived has also fueled speculation that something was going on.

    The precautions taken to ensure Lusitania's safety in March and the safety of other vessels since the Germans declared the waters around Britain a war zone were conspicuously absent on Lusitania's last crossing.  The Admiralty had ten days to aid Lusitania and did not.  From this, one would come to two conclusions:
    - The Admiralty did plan to expose Lusitania to danger in the off chance that a German submarine would attack her, enraging the American public.
    - The Admiralty fouled up, and their gross negligence resulted in a tremendous loss of life.
    However, one must realize that if any conspiracy happened, it cannot be designed in great detail and must leave a great deal to chance.  The British codebreakers of Room 40 did not always have the most updated locations of German submarines, and the U-boats of the First World War did not have reliable aim.  The chances that any torpedo would hit the very spot that would have dealt Lusitania a fatal blow were impossibly remote; in fact, if Schwieger had not overestimated Lusitania's speed by four knots, the torpedo would have struck elsewhere, and the ship would not have sunk.  

    Any possible conspiracy could only have been one of withholding information from Lusitania and leaving chance to put the ship into harm's way.  A successful U-boat attack would require the submarine to be, not within a few miles, but within a few hundred yards of Lusitania and on a bearing suitable for attack.  Furthermore, for a ship as meticulously designed as Lusitania, the plotters probably only imagined an injured but stable Lusitania limping into Queenstown, hoping that the attempt alone would anger the United States into joining the Allies.  A complete sinking with tremendous loss of life, however, would have been unthinkable and must have horrified the plotters, spurring them into a hasty cover-up.

    One must realize that in the lack of hard evidence, any suspicion of a government conspiracy is only circumstancial.  That, in and of itself, is not proof of any government plot.

    A foul-up, however, was also possible.  At the time, the Admiralty had been preoccupied with Churchill's brainchild, the Dardanelles campaign, Lusitania must have only been an afterthought to the men of the Admiralty. This situation was worsened by the fact that both Churchill and First Sea Lord Jacky Fisher kept information to themselves and were known to micromanage. Their refusal to delegate jobs led to Churchill's and Fisher's subordinates being ill-equipped to act on their own, leading to no one acting, or even consider acting, to protect Lusitania.  Furthermore, it would have been unthinkable for a ship as fast as Lusitania to be attacked, let alone sunk, so actions to protect her might not have been deemed necessary. 

    A foul-up could also explain the cover-up:  if the truth of such a foul-up had been made public, it would have been a tremendous national humiliation played out in front of the Central Powers and a blow to British morale.  As it was, no one in the upper ranks of the Admiralty was held accountable for this bungling, and Churchill and First Sea Lord Jacky Fisher were eager to push the blame onto Captain Turner.

    The idea of Churchill trying to pull the United States into the war would be unlikely due to the following reasons:

    In 1915, the United States had not yet mobilized for war, and Britain was dependent on the US for the British Army in France.  If the US had declared war right after the Lusitania's sinking, the supplies that had once been going to Britain would have stayed in the US, leaving the British without ammunition to fight the Germans.

    Churchill and Fisher were known to keep information to themselves and micromanage the affairs of Room 40.  Fisher was close to a nervous breakdown at the time and Churchill was in France at the time of Lusitania's sinking.  If Churchill had wanted Lusitania sunk, such a plan could not have happened without his explicit approval, and he would have stayed in Britain to supervise the plot instead of being in France.  Diana Preston advances a theory that, without Fisher and Churchill, Captain William Reginald Hall could have masterminded such a plot.  Captain (later Admiral) Hall was known to use cloak-and-dagger tactics, had access to all the relevant decodes of Room 40, and capable of acting independently of Fisher and Churchill.  Whether he could have executed such a plan without Churchill's knowledge and approval, however, remains speculative.


  30. What was the government cover-up over the Lusitania sinking?

    A: While the rest of the world was engulfed in the First World War, the United States was officially a neutral country in 1915 that sold munitions to the British despite American neutrality laws.  Such actions were officially illegal, and anyone who facilitated such an action would be jailed.  In practice, however, sympathetic and business-attuned Americans ignored these regulations and knowingly allowed the British to ship war goods out of the USA on ships like Lusitania.

    The facts of the Lusitania's last crossing remain that the Admiralty did not do their utmost to protect the Lusitania, that Lusitania was carrying munitions under the guise of a passenger ship, and that the ship suffered from a second, unexplained explosion and sank bow-first in under 20 minutes.  While one cannot definitely say that the second explosion was caused by the munitions in the cargo hold, even the suggestion of it would have been damning to the British cause.  This, in combination with the aforementioned facts, would have blunted the horror of the German attack and brought into question Britain's practice of using women and children to ensure the delivery of their war cargo.  With these revelations, United States could hardly be expected to continue to turn a blind eye to British munitions running practices, and Britain's much needed supply of war material would have been in serious danger of being cut.

    In light of this national threat, the inquests deliberately discarded testimony of witnesses who claimed that only one torpedo and an internal explosion sank the ship, and went on to destroy the reputation of second cabin passenger Joseph Marichal who claimed that munitions were the source of the second explosion.  The cargo manifests may have been deliberately changed to end any speculation that the cargo was explosive (see question #26), regardless of the cause of the second explosion.  Eager to absolve the Admiralty of negligence in handling Lusitania's last days, Churchill and Fisher were quick to pin as much blame on Captain Turner as possible, backdating Admiralty orders, distorting geography, and hiring the best legal talent to prove Captain Turner guilty.  The reputation of a man like Turner could hardly have mattered to Churchill and Fisher when the survival of Britain was at stake.  Lord Mersey, who presided over the inquest, however, was aware of the political sensitivities during wartime, and made sure that everyone on the British side came out whitewashed and that only the Germans were pronounced as the villains.

    And yet the story does not end there.  Certain documents and exchanges between Lusitania and the Admiralty, which undoubtedly would have painted the Admiralty as grossly negligent at best, remain classified to this day.  Researchers, authors, and the general public still do not have access to these documents, which begs the question, what about the Lusitania's last voyage still needs to be classified almost 100 years after her sinking?

    From Beesly's Room 40, page 122: "The mysterious signals between the Admiralty and the Lusitania between 5 and 7 May may well hold the answer.  The file seems to have been in the possession of the Admiralty as recently as 1972.  Now it has vanished again!"

    From Preston's Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy, page 384:
    Many of the Cunard Company's Lusitania files disappeared under mysterious circumstances.  Some but not all of them have resurfaced and been purchased by the Cunard archives.  Official files in Britain, the United States, and Germany give tantalizing leads that then disappear.  Blank sheets inserted to preserve pagination sequences suggest that certain documents, like telegrams sent to and from the ship during her final voyage, have been removed.  The authenticity of certain "official" documents or alleged statements is open to question.

  31.  Who, then, is ultimately responsible for the sinking of Lusitania?

    Without a doubt, the immediate guilty party is Captain-lieutenant Walther Schwieger of the U-20, who acted on orders of the Imperial German Navy or Goverment and fired the fatal torpedo.  Radioed signals of congratulations to U-20 from the Commander-in-Chief of the Hochseefleet reveal with absolute clarity that Lusitania was indeed a prime target.  Furthermore, the declaration of the war zone around the British Isles and rather ineffective submarine blockade was a pronounced breach of previously established International Law, a fact that the Germans admitted in 1917.  Therefore, the brunt of the responsibility rests on the shoulders of the Imperial German Government.

    Conversely, the reasonable expectation that Lusitania would have limped into port if the torpedo had hit elsewhere on the ship, also brings into question what role Britain's shipping of munitions on express passenger ships like Lusitania played in the disaster. In addition, Captain Turner's decision to steer in a straight line for 25 minutes up to the torpedoing, as well as the glaring inaction on behalf of the Admiralty to protect Lusitania, were definite contributors to the sinking.  


  32.  Did the sinking of the Lusitania cause the United States to enter the First World War?

    A:  Indirectly.  While Lusitania was sunk on 7 May 1915, the United States did not enter the war until 6 April 1917, and therefore, Lusitania was not the proximate cause of the US's entry into the First World War.  The sinking did serve to turn American public opinion against Germany and German Americans, who up to that time were trusted members of the American "melting pot."  Even though the United States was a neutral country, German sympathizers were as visible and socially acceptable in American society as British sympathizers.  Germany's invasion of neutral Belgium in 1914 had failed to capture American sympathies, and Germany's submarine attacks without the Lusitania sinking did not have the number of American fatalities to horrify the American public into declaring war.  The Lusitania disaster, however, with almost 1,200 noncombatants, 124 Americans, and 94 children dead (31 of which were infants) had irreparably damaged American public opinion towards Germany.  Before Lusitania, any submarine attack that resulted in the loss of American lives resulted in a German apology that the US promptly accepted.  After Lusitania, German apologies were no longer sufficient.  It was only a matter of time before the US would join the war on the Allied side.
References:
 Minutes of Evidence as given at the Mersey Inquiry.

Bailey, Thomas A. and Paul B. Ryan.  The Lusitania Disaster:  An Episode in Modern Warfare and Diplomacy.  The Free Press, 1975.

Beesly, Patrick.  Room 40.  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982.

Ballard, Robert D. and Spencer Dunmore.  Exploring the Lusitania.  Warner Books, 1995.

Collins, Max Allan.  The Lusitania Murders.  Berkley, 2002.

Hoehling, A. A.  Lost at Sea.  Stackpole Books, 1984.

Hoehling, A. A. and Mary Hoehling.  The Last Voyage of the Lusitania.  Madison Books, 1956.

Layton, J. Kent.  "Lusitania" at Atlantic Liners.  Online.  <http://www.atlanticliners.com/lusitania_home.htm>

O'Sullivan, Patrick.  Lusitania:  Unravelling the Mysteries.  Collins Press, 1999.

Preston, Diana.  Lusitania:  An Epic Tragedy.  Berkley Books, 2002.

Simpson, Colin.  The Lusitania.  Little, Brown, and Company, 1972.

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